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uch of the discourse about regional and
local economic development strategies
in the United States over the past
twenty-five years has looked like a
search for general rules. Very few such rules have emerged,
in part because—like all policy debates—there have been
large inputs of ideology and self-interest, as well as profes-
sional inquiry, but in part because the appropriate strate-
gies really are time- and place-specific. The strategies that
are right depend on, first, the diagnosis of the economic
problems and potential of that region or city at that time
and, second, an assessment of just what it is that interven-
tion can achieve in the circumstances of time and place.
The authors of the other papers presented at this conference
deal systematically and exhaustively with the fundamentals
of the New York region’s economic conditions and pros-
pects, but it is essential that this paper start with an expo-
sition of the economic setting for the discussion of policy
intervention that comprises the bulk of the paper.
THE NEW YORK ECONOMY IN 
THE LONG TERM: THE PAST
Twenty years ago, most observers projected continual
decline in the New York economy, and almost any eco-
nomic development strategy seemed pointless.1 Indeed, in
the mid-1970s—beginning before the fiscal crisis of
1975—the city and state governments of New York were
making virtually no capital expenditures remotely related
to economic development. Instead, capital budgets were
devoted to subsidized housing, public office buildings, and
current operating expenditures like “transit fare stabiliza-
tion.” The scattered tax incentive measures (in the midst of
frequent tax increases) involved extremely deep subsidies,
sometimes providing for recovery of more than 100 percent
of the private investment from reductions in taxes that
would have been payable in the absence of the new invest-
M
*Dick Netzer is a professor of economics and public administration in
the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, 
New York University.94 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / FEBRUARY 1997
ment, in addition to exemption from much of the taxes
that should have been triggered by the investment. 
The first major commercial building project after
the slump—Donald Trump’s conversion of the old Com-
modore Vanderbilt Hotel into the Grand Hyatt—involved
incentives that virtually eliminated any risk for Trump and
his partners. In contrast, less than ten years ago, projections
were so optimistic that many critics of the city government
saw no need for public subsidies or tax preferences to foster
economic growth.2 The critics often urged not only the
elimination of subsidies but also increases in business prop-
erty taxes. Although at the extremes of despair and opti-
mism no economic development strategies may make
sense, between those extremes the long-term economic
prognosis does make considerable difference in prescribing
economic development strategies. 
It helps, in thinking about the economic future of
the region, to briefly review the past. New York’s economic
history since the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 has
been one of almost continuous rise and fall of particular
industries and sectors, with the sectors that were the well-
springs of the economy in one generation fading and being
displaced by new sectors (see Hoover and Vernon [1959]
for the classic statement of this idea). Through the 1940s,
the result of the displacement process was net growth in
the aggregates (employment being the only one that really
was measured in those years): the increases in economic
activity in the rising sectors, together with the multipliers
in local consumer-serving activities, exceeded the declines
in the shrinking sectors. In the 1950s, for the first time
ever in a period of national economic prosperity there was
almost no net growth in employment in New York City, as
fairly strong growth in office activities was balanced by the
onset of substantial losses in a wide range of manufacturing
and other goods-handling activities. There was, however,
considerable growth in the rest of the New York region.
The Vernon study of the economic future of the
New York region, published in 1959 and 1960, projected
more of the same through 1985, but with net growth in
New York City from very strong office activities and a
large consumer-sector multiplier and considerable growth
in the rest of the region.3 During the 1960s, that is exactly
what happened: the decline in goods handling within the
city continued apace; the securities industry grew rapidly,
as did most producer services; both residential and office
construction were strong; and public expenditure for capi-
tal projects, current operations, and transfer payments
increased very rapidly indeed.4 New York City, unlike
nearly all other large central cities in the Frostbelt, had sig-
nificant employment gains during the 1960s. The rest of
the region did very well indeed, although manufacturing
employment did not increase at the rate the Vernon study
had forecast.
The 1969-77 slump is surprisingly poorly docu-
mented, perhaps because its dramatic qualities were over-
shadowed by the city government fiscal crisis of 1975. The
trigger was a national recession combined with the end of a
bull securities market. Employment in the securities
industry contracted substantially, and was flat for most
other financial services. New York’s decline continued after
the national economy turned around in 1970, in part
because the long boom in office building construction had
ended. In some ways, the early years of the slump were like
the 1980s slump in the “oil-patch” Sun Belt cities:  a sharp
contraction in the main local specialization and the inevita-
ble cyclical end of a construction boom as the vacancy rates
rose. However, in New York City, the long decline in
goods-handling activities continued, preventing any early
recovery in total employment. Moreover, unlike the 1980s,
there was no real lift from the tourism and entertainment
industries (Broadway had its worst seasons in history in the
mid-1970s).
The rest of the region began to recover after 1971,
but—along with the city—was set back by a new and
much more severe national recession in 1974. The subur-
ban economies were also depressed by the lower level of
personal income associated with Manhattan central busi-
ness district jobs held by commuters living in the subur-
ban counties. 
As is well known (from the history of the fiscal cri-
sis), state and local government expenditure continued to
increase rapidly in the first half of the 1970s. That was
mainly in the form of increased transfer and interest pay-
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General Fund spending increased by close to one-third in
real terms between fiscal years 1969 and 1976) but only
small increases in employment. Indeed, the central city
seemed to have run out of job-growth sectors, and few
observers saw much prospect for trend reversals, ever. To
some extent, the fiscal profligacy of the period between late
1971 and early 1975 can be attributed to this doomsday
view: if the city, as a place, was doomed to continuous
decline, why should the city government not do whatever
it could to cushion the decline in the short run? (The
answer, of course, is that the short run had to be very
short—lenders could and did realize that the prospects for
repayment of the short-term debt were becoming dim—
and that the fiscal profligacy itself encouraged private-
sector flight.)
After 1977, there was a reversal, and recovery,
which started slowly but accelerated, until 1989. In
essence, although goods-handling employment continued
to decline in the central city, virtually all of the other
1969-77 trends were reversed. Within the city, the engines
of growth were the financial services industries, other high-
end producer services, the media industries, tourism (espe-
cially the increase in high-spending overseas visitors),
health services, and a new construction boom. The rest of
the region also did well from these same sources, but in
addition there was the effect of the marked increase in
defense spending that began in 1979; the New York region
turns out to have been more dependent on defense procure-
ment than most observers had noticed.
State and local government public expenditure
trends were also reversed in the initial years of recovery,
and there were numerous cuts in tax rates. The New York
City General Fund expenditure actually declined in real
terms (by about 30 percent) between fiscal years 1976 and
1983, but climbed steeply once again after fiscal 1983. A
similar but less pronounced pattern occurred in New York
and New Jersey state government expenditures.
THE NEW YORK ECONOMY IN 
THE LONG TERM: THE FUTURE
The decline in the region’s economy that began in 1989
has some uncomfortable similarities with the slump that
began twenty years earlier. Once again, employment in the
securities industry was cut back sharply, and the office
building construction boom petered out. Once again, there
have been no obvious major sources of expansion to counter
the gloom. And once again, there have been serious bud-
getary problems, this time involving the New York State
government even more than the New York City govern-
ment, addressed (in the case of the state government) by
methods that remind people of 1971-75. 
Even the differences between the first half of the
1970s and the first half of the 1990s with respect to the
region’s economy are disquieting, for the most part. The
sharp declines in defense-related employment (especially in
Long Island and Connecticut), weakness in other manufac-
turing industries in the region outside the older centers,
contraction in employment in commercial banking and
(prospectively) in health services, and the effects on the
region of corporate downsizing were not phenomena of the
earlier period, but are very much present today. The only
current economic conditions that are comfortably different
from the earlier period are related to (1) globalization—the
relatively greater importance of international financial and
business services in the region’s economy and the growth of
tourism; (2) some shrinkage in the cost differentials
between the region and its main competitors (in part, too,
associated with globalization, because more of the compet-
itors are very high-cost cities in Asia and Europe rather
than low-cost cities in North America); and (3) the absence
of spectacular financial mismanagement by the New York
City government to frighten business away.
Were the pessimists of the mid-1970s right in
believing that the long-term prospects were, and are, dis-
mal, with the 1977-89 period an aberration? Probably not;
it seems to me as likely today that the New York economy
can do well over the long term, as it did to Vernon in
1960.5 As in 1960, the region has a favorable “mix” of
industries, that is, substantial concentration in sectors
likely to grow worldwide. Over the long term, the world-
wide demand for high-end financial and other business ser-
vices will continue to be very strong. No doubt, the region
will lose “shares” of the rapidly growing sectors to other
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be achieved multiply. However, while more and more of
today’s high-end services will be better accommodated in
smaller places, new specialized types will develop and—as
in the recent past—will seek very central locations, such as
New York, London, and Tokyo. 
A generation ago, Vernon predicted that by
improving transportation technology, both decentraliza-
tion and centralization of headquarters and other business
and financial services would be facilitated. A few contem-
porary scholars, notably Moss (1987), have been pointing
out that changes in communications technology are having
the same effect. It would be ridiculous in the extreme to
postulate no improvements in communications technology
from here on, or to postulate that whatever further
improvements there are will work only to decentralize:
both propositions are at odds with experience.
The advanced services show up in a good many
places in the Standard Industrial Classification, not only in
classes 60-63, 73, and 89. Much of New York’s economy
has been transformed, under the names of traditional
industry groups, somewhat in the way that so much in
eastern Michigan was transformed by the mid-1950s into
branches of the auto industry while continuing to bear
names of quite different industries. However, unlike Mich-
igan’s auto industry, New York’s advanced services industry
is not really a single industry; it is highly diverse and not
dependent on swings in demand that are almost com-
pletely convergent in timing. Moreover, the product mix
changes rapidly.
Often in the past, and today again, some of the
pessimism for the long term arises because it seems incon-
ceivable that there can be much further growth in the
demand for those services now being produced (in the city
or even in the country or world): If productivity increases,
then employment—say, in banking—must decline. It is
impossible to predict exactly what services (or goods) any
sector will be producing fifteen or twenty years hence; his-
tory shows that it is absurd to assume that growth in a sec-
tor will cease because of a surfeit of those services in today’s
product mix. It is our imagination, rather than the econ-
omy, that has long-run problems.6
In addition, most of the more traditional sectors
will do marginally better than in the past, in part simply
because they are so much smaller and now include cohorts
of firms that have adjusted to cost and other adverse com-
petitive factors in the New York location. To some extent,
they will be bolstered by the continuing high level of over-
seas immigration, as has been the case since the late 1970s.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that personal incomes
will continue to rise substantially without spilling over
into New York City retail trade and consumer services.
In a 1996 article in City Journal, Professor Edward L.
Glaeser of Harvard tells a nonprofessional audience “Why
Economists Still Like Cities.” In a superb survey of the evi-
dence, he goes through the traditional arguments in favor
of the persistence and growth of large urban concentra-
tions, arguments relating essentially to the higher produc-
tivity associated with the economies of agglomeration and
coordination, arguments that date far back in the history of
economic thought. However, in recent years numerous
economists have added new conceptual wrinkles to the
arguments and amassed substantial empirical evidence in
support of them.7 The arguments suggest that large city
(read, urban area) size is not a disability, despite the spread
of economies of agglomeration to smaller cities over time.
Glaeser reaffirms the Vernon point that telecommunica-
tions cannot replace face-to-face communication, the
essence of the New York region’s difference from smaller
cities and from a good many modestly sized “new-model”
cities that have become big cities in the United States in
recent decades, such as Phoenix and Charlotte. In such cit-
ies, economic activities cluster not to be near one another
but because each of them separately finds that city to be
advantageous in its climate, low labor costs, accessibility,
and amenities:  the physical traffic among the office build-
ings during the course of the working day is startlingly
sparse.8
In short, the long-term competitive outlook for
the New York City economy is not so bleak as to make any
economic development strategy quixotic. Moreover, the
optimism expressed above is guarded: the projections are
for very modest rates of real growth, in employment terms
less than 20 percent over twenty-odd years. Such growth
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easy for city and state governments to finance generous lev-
els of public services—the two reasons that traditionally
make state and city governments intervene to foster
growth. Because much central city economic distress is
associated with low labor force participation rates even in
the face of low rates of unemployment, it may be that even
the most effective of economic development strategies will
be unable to massively reduce poverty and solve what has
been described as the “two cities” problem:  a large core of
poor people outside the mainstream economy and unaf-
fected by positive economic developments, in the midst of
prosperous city economies. 
The experience of the 1980s has in fact been inter-
preted in this way by some economists and most popular
writers on the subject. However, most large, old cities had
only a few years with low unemployment rates in the
1980s, after years of much higher rates. It seems foolish to
forecast that sustained high demand for labor will not
affect labor force participation rates over time, thus partly
dissolving the two cities problem. Indeed, the optimistic
long-run projections generated by widely used econometric
models in the late 1980s were made to converge only by
pushing labor force participation up sharply in the out
years.9
WHAT INTERVENTION CAN ACHIEVE:  
THE NEW YORK CONTEXT
The discourse on regional and local economic development,
like the discourses on national “industrial policy” and on
international trade policy, is dominated by the debate
between interventionists and skeptics. To the intervention-
ists, market imperfections legitimize—indeed, demand—
active economic development policies, and the growing
sophistication of public entrepreneurs makes it likely that
they can avoid the egregious mistakes often made in
regional economic development in an earlier, more naive
era.10 The skeptics, in contrast, have no confidence in the
ability of state and local officials to pick winners rather
than losers; to avoid giving away, in tax preferences or more
direct subsidies, far more than is necessary to elicit the
favorable location decisions; or to build location-affecting
elements into general policies concerning education, infra-
structure, and the like.
Among professional economists, the most power-
ful case for the interventionist position is made by Bartik
(1991). Bartik carefully summarizes the evidence from doz-
ens of econometric studies of the effects on state or local
economic growth of major policy instruments—notably,
differences among the states in taxes and expenditures, as
well as the effects of specific economic development pro-
grams such as “enterprise zones” and the effects of differ-
ences that are only loosely related to public policy, wage
rates, and the extent of unionization.11 He concludes that
the effects on growth rates are indeed fairly strong. Much
of the study is devoted to an examination of the conse-
quences of local economic growth, which he finds to be
strongly positive on both distributive and efficiency
grounds, concluding with “two cheers” for interventionist
state and local policies.
There are at least two general considerations rele-
vant to the issue of whether interventionist policies are
likely to be successful and efficient. The first concerns the
size of the place in question. It seems plausible that the
larger the place, the better the case of the skeptics. In a
small place, highly targeted economic development policy
decisions may be made so infrequently that the likelihood
of gross error can be reduced substantially. That is, the gov-
ernmental decision makers should not be overwhelmed by
the sheer necessity of negotiating a large number of deals
simultaneously, without much scrutiny by anyone else,
which seems to have been a real problem in the past at city
and state levels in New York. Also, it is easier to make vis-
ible changes in the “climate” for location decisions in a
small place than in a region like this one, where a multibillion-
dollar investment program may not persuade anyone but
the technicians that transportation facilities, for example,
have in fact been improved. Moreover, the information
costs of reaching all or most potential entrepreneurs can be
extremely high in a large place. There are frequent reports
in this area that most proprietors of small enterprises,
actual or potential, are quite unaware of most incentive
programs.
So, on this score, skepticism seems a reasonable
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egies for the New York region:  the burden of proof should
be on the advocates of interventionist measures. 
However, the case for interventionist policies also
depends upon whether or not existing public policies are
essentially neutral with respect to economic development.
If existing public policies are generally hostile to economic
development, then an interventionist posture may be nec-
essary merely to offset the damage that governments are
doing.
The fact is that, in the New York metropolitan
region, policies are not neutral:  there is a long tradition of
public sector hostility—quite deliberate at times in the
past, unintended more recently—to policies that are neu-
tral with respect to economic development. There are regu-
latory regimes that are, or have been, hostile to new and
expanding firms and that raise the prices of producer goods
and services. A stark example is the sharp differential
between residential and business utility rates under regula-
tion. Over the years, the differentials have been greater in
New York State than in most other states, compounding
the fact that all rates, residential as well as business, have
been very high relative to those in any other state. This dis-
crimination also applies to utility-type services provided
by state and local governments, such as excessive “tipping
fees” for the use of public landfills by private carters serv-
ing business customers, and highway-user taxes and
charges on commercial vehicles that are in no way cost-
based but are far higher than those on noncommercial
vehicles.12 
The private sector must support an exceedingly
expensive public sector, costly for reasons that are not
entirely clear. That is, the costs are high even taking into
account the high unit costs of density, the conventional
wisdom about diseconomies of scale in the production of
local public services, the popularity (at least in the past) of
explicitly redistributive policies, and what can best be
called mindless populism.13 
The costly public sector is financed by a revenue
structure that combines explicit redistributive goals (grad-
uated city and state personal income taxes, among others)
and substantial reliance on revenue instruments that are
sold as not affecting ordinary households, such as very high
taxes on telephone service, high transaction taxes on real
estate transfers (in New York), and imposition of the sales
tax on a wide range of intermediate business purchases and
high corporate income taxes (in all three states). In reality,
of course, such instruments are likely to have zero, or even
perverse, distributive results, as well as negative effects on
economic development.
The extreme example may be the way the property
tax works in New York City (and Nassau County). A com-
bination of state law and local choice (mostly by local law
but to some extent in the form of administrative practice)
has produced effective tax rates that average above 4 per-
cent for new commercial buildings that are not favored
with targeted economic development incentives, about
3 percent for utility properties, and about 2 percent for
older commercial properties and for rental apartment
buildings, but considerably below 1 percent for home-
owner properties, most high-end co-op and condominium
apartments, and vacant land.14 The adverse economic
effects of the high rates (anything above 1 percent is high
by national standards) are obvious. In addition, the exist-
ence of the low-rate classes does not do much for economic
development, because the substantial decline in those rates
during the 1980s seems to have been capitalized into hous-
ing and land prices almost instantaneously. The system is
also highly objectionable on distributional grounds: in
addition to the much better treatment of owner-occupants
than renters, within the residential classes effective tax
rates decline systematically with the value of the housing
unit.
Given the hostile public policy environment in
much of the region, economic development strategies that
essentially undo this hostility, perhaps doing no more than
restoring a neutral posture, seem a good idea. It is not
obvious whether the instruments of these strategies should
be highly selective or work across the board—assuming
that the state and city governments cannot simply reverse
the hostile policies (and there is good reason not to, where
the damage has already been done and reversal will result
mainly in windfall gains). Across-the-board instruments
inevitably will have an element of inefficiency, benefiting
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present-value terms, from the standpoint of location deci-
sion making. However, selectivity requires both a high
order of insight by officials and considerable bargaining
skill.
 On the spending side—that is, improving the
quality of inputs (for example, infrastructure, labor, current
public services) and subsidies to reduce input costs—selec-
tivity seems very inappropriate in New York City, if not in
general. Direct input subsidies, notably to lower the cost of
capital, have not had an impressive record anywhere, and
virtually all such uses in New York City have been fail-
ures—subsidies to marginal enterprises that soon collapse.
Programs to improve labor quality by offering training
that is highly specific to individual firms or industries, on
which considerable sums of federal money were spent in
the 1970s, have fared no better. In addition, in New York’s
high-density environment it is difficult to design highly
selective improvements in infrastructure or current public
services: either most of the benefits spill over to nontar-
geted users (indeed, sometimes to users whose presence the
city has no reason to encourage) or the specific improve-
ment is so confined in scope that there is no perceptible
effect on the quality of the service in question.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH
General improvement in publicly provided services that
are of importance to firms appears to be a superior strategy.
The costs of general improvements in educational output
or in transport system reliability are of course very high.
However, there is no real sense in which the benefits of
such improvements can be said to have been wasted
entirely, even if the impact on economic development is
not readily observable in the short run. It is important in
designing this strategy, however, to differentiate between
improvements that are producer-oriented and those that
are consumer-oriented. 
A striking illustration of the difference in the New
York area is the inattention in transportation policy to
goods movement, relative to the attention given to high-
way facilities that are closed to trucks, including some
roads whose main function is to serve as journey-to-work
routes that parallel rail commuter services, such as the
Northern and Southern State Parkways on Long Island and
the north-south parkways in Westchester. The importance
of this point is heightened when it is recognized that the
proportion of goods movement by rail is lower in the New
York region than in any other large urban area in North
America. There are obvious policy changes that could dra-
matically lower road transport costs for goods and business
services by reversing the priorities in the allocation of road
space away from auto commuting.15 
There is a considerable empirical literature on the
effects of state and local public expenditure for various
broadly defined functions on measures of aggregate eco-
nomic growth. In some of the most important studies, Fed-
eral Reserve economists have researched the effects of the
stock of infrastructure (which, as measured, reflects the his-
torical spending record) on growth. It is fair to say that the
skeptics seem to have had the best of the argument so far
with respect to infrastructure, but that may be mainly
because the aggregate measures of infrastructure spending
or stock for states as units of observation are unsatisfactory
in various ways. Ideally, the independent variable should be
a measure of the overall quality (as perceived by users) of
the services provided by each major component of infra-
structure, not the level of spending over a period of years or
the depreciated replacement costs of the present stock of
capital in the form of infrastructure.16 The expenditure-
based data probably vary among states in ways that are
quite different from the ideal measure.
Bartik (1991) reviews the findings of nearly thirty
studies of the effects of difference in “public services” on
business location, in addition to the infrastructure stock
studies. Public services sometimes are measured by physi-
cal quantities (such as mileage of highways per square mile
of area) but mostly by expenditures per capita or as a per-
centage of personal income. In six of the studies, expendi-
ture for schools had a positive and significant effect on the
dependent variable; in three studies, police and fire expen-
ditures had such an effect; in three studies, highway expen-
diture or physical stock had that effect; and there were
positive and significant coefficients for health in two stud-
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blanks, that is, positive coefficients that were not statisti-
cally significant or negative coefficients. These findings
hardly make a strong case for spending more money on
broad categories of public services as a route to economic
growth in a state or urban region.
It should be obvious why more spending for pub-
lic services that are in fact logically connected with eco-
nomic growth—infrastructure and human capital—seems
to have so much less impact in advanced countries than in
developing countries, where the impact can be huge. Take
transportation, for example. In a mountainous developing
country, the road between the capital and a town twenty
miles away may be so bad that there is no motorized trans-
port between the two places, and the town is effectively
isolated from the national economy. Rebuilding the road to
permit the use of buses and trucks reduces trip time from
all day to one hour each way, converting the town into a
component of the capital’s market area. However, in an
advanced country, the road network permits motorized
travel from every point to every other point within the
country and travel on rather good roads every place in
urban regions. An immense investment program, such as
$100 billion over five years, is likely to yield an infinitesi-
mal improvement in aggregate accessibility measured, say,
by the percentage reduction in mean travel time per trip
for all types of trips weighted by the value of different
types of trips:  mean trip time may decline from 25 min-
utes to 24.98 minutes. This does not mean that the invest-
ment program is unwise, only that we should not
determine its wisdom largely on the basis of its contribu-
tion to aggregate economic growth, which is likely to be
below the threshold for measurement.
As the comment above about the hostile treatment
of trucks and other business-service vehicles in highway
policy in the New York area suggests, this is not to say that
well-considered public expenditures cannot have positive
economic development effects. Much of the criticism of the
conditions at and access to Kennedy Airport over the years
has been based quite explicitly on concerns for the negative
effects on the region’s economy. There is non-anecdotal evi-
dence about the effects of quality of services: two recent
articles (Button et al. 1995; Wassmer 1994) report empiri-
cal findings that suggest that public spending can have
significant effects when the spending produces real differ-
ences in the quality of transportation and other publicly
provided services.17 
TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
On the tax policy side, the choice between general and
selective economic development measures is less clear cut,
at least in New York. Hindsight reveals some fairly large
errors in tax policies in New York that were implemented
largely for economic development reasons over the past fif-
teen years, whether those policies were across the board or
selective. There has been no discernible effect of the general
investment and employment incentive provisions in the
corporate income taxes, according to repeated studies cov-
ering a considerable span of years by the New York State
Legislative Tax Study Commission. The very large as-of-
right property tax reductions in New York City designed
to produce more yuppie housing (the condominium and
co-op conversion aspects of the so-called J-51 program) in
the late 1970s and early 1980s—as an economic develop-
ment measure, not to subsidize housing as such—appear to
have given away far more than was necessary to elicit the
investment: generally, the resulting rates of return were
very high indeed.18
The highly selective, often very large, reductions
in property taxes negotiated with corporate developers of
specific large office buildings throughout the 1980s and
1990s have also been highly inefficient in numerous cases,
either because after the fact it became clear that the tax
preference was far in excess of the taxpayer’s reservation
price or because the firm subsequently reneged on the
employment guarantees that were part of the negotia-
tion—sometimes not increasing employment as promised
and, in at least one well-publicized case, simply moving
away from the city a few years after the deal was signed and
the building put up.
Nonetheless, some of the negotiated deals seem in
retrospect to have been exactly right, for the time and cir-
cumstances, giving away in taxes almost exactly what was
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more dire the circumstances, the more likely this was the
case. Thus, the deals that now look most justified are those
made for central business district projects in the dismal
late 1970s, when the recovery was just beginning, and
those made for projects outside the central business dis-
trict, in locations that had been decidedly unattractive to
office developers.
However, on balance, well-designed changes in tax
policy seem less error prone than selective tax preferences.
On this issue, we have the results of a generation of studies
of tax levels and economic growth to use as a basis for
choice among policies. Bartik (1991) reviewed 123 sepa-
rate studies of the effects of tax levels on business activity.
The studies were published between 1980 and 1991 and
for the most part relied on data from the 1970s and early
1980s. Almost 100 of the studies were inter-area (state or
metropolitan area) in focus; the rest focused on changes and
differences within states or within metropolitan areas.
They differed widely with respect to the dependent vari-
able—the measure of economic activity or growth—but
fifty of the studies were confined to manufacturing vari-
ables of one kind or another.19 The tax variables also dif-
fered greatly: most employed some aggregative measure
such as state and local taxes on a per capita basis or as a
share of personal income or gross state product, while the
others used effective tax rates for one or a number of
taxes.20 
Ninety of the 123 studies reported at least one sta-
tistically significant negative tax effect. The reported long-
run elasticities of business activity with respect to taxes
clustered in the -0.2 to -0.4 range for the inter-area studies,
with the studies that employed controls for public spend-
ing levels and/or “fixed effects” generally having the higher
figures. As would be expected, the intra-area studies
tended to find much higher elasticities, usually -1.5 or
higher.
What do these results tell us? They provide over-
whelming evidence that taxes do matter in location, some-
thing that was disputed by most economists and many
politicians twenty years ago.21 They also show that taxes
matter a lot:  if state and local taxes in a state amount to
12 percent of gross state product (GSP), close to the New
York level, and the elasticity is -0.4, a $1 billion reduction
in the overall level of taxes in that state should increase
GSP over time by $3.3 billion. However, the results also
indicate that the tax cuts will not pay for themselves in
budgetary terms unless (1) the higher rate of economic
growth improbably reduces the level of public expenditure
(the opposite could be the case) and/or (2) the tax reduction
interacts with other events to produce a cumulative growth
process that is not entirely attributable to the tax policy
changes as such.
Some of the studies reported by Bartik suggest the
possibility of stronger effects in this region. Some of the
intra-area studies with high elasticities were not studies of
a single metropolitan area or region, but of whole states
(including large ones) or of one large city compared with
the rest of the country. This geography has some relevance
to the New York region’s competitive position within the
northeastern United States. Also, most of the studies in
which the independent variable was the effective rate of
one or more taxes paid by business firms tended to have
higher elasticities. Because such taxes are very high in this
region (relative to the rest of the United States, not neces-
sarily relative to major competing cities in other countries),
it is conceivable that policies focused on reducing those
taxes would be self-financing over time.
PROMISING TAX STRATEGIES 
FOR THE REGION
Economists like to write as if state and local governments
face absolute budget constraints and therefore cannot stand
tax cuts that are not fully self-financing. This is of course
true in the long run, but not necessarily in the short run.
However, given the fiscal history of state and local govern-
ments in this region over the past quarter century, even
short-run budget deficits are not really tolerable—and
probably would have damaging effects on the location of
economic activity since the deficits would guarantee that
tax rates would have to rise and/or expenditure levels
would have to be cut quite soon. So, although we may be
persuaded that what the region needs is to reduce its over-
all tax receipts as a percentage of GSP to the national aver-
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GSP with respect to taxes may be a very high -0.6, it is
impossible to imagine how one could manage the needed
reduction, about 20 percent of total revenue from all taxes,
state and local, for the three states combined.22
This quandary suggests that the targets for tax
reduction in the region should be those tax instruments
that affect business costs fairly directly and entail very high
rates but are not the most important revenue producers,
rather than broad-based rate cuts in the major taxes—not a
very populist political strategy. One example is reform of
the state and local taxation of utility-supplied energy and
telephone services to business customers, taxation that is
extraordinarily high in New York State but somewhat
above the national average in the other two states as well.23
Another example would be the removal of most intermedi-
ate business purchases from the scope of the sales tax. The
region’s states do have some rivals in other parts of the
country in the assiduous effort to convert the sales tax from
a consumption tax to one mostly on business inputs, but
many of those rivals are states with lower sales tax rates.
We combine high sales tax rates and broad coverage of
business inputs (but not particularly broad coverage of con-
sumer goods and services). 
There are some seemingly plausible targets that
have been singled out by tax study commissions and tax
reform programs in New York City time and again: nota-
bly, the city’s tax on unincorporated business income and
its tax on commercial rents. Although these taxes are con-
spicuous because they are unique to New York City, they
are not especially damaging tax instruments, despite their
bad reputation. 
The unincorporated business tax (UBT) is one on
the net income from business or professional activities con-
ducted within the city, imposed at a rate of 4 percent and
applying only to proprietors and partnerships once their
incomes exceed $30,000. Residents pay this tax in addition
to the ordinary resident personal income tax. Why does
New York City have such a tax when no other place does?
When New York City thirty years ago requested and
received authority from the state legislature to impose, for
the first time, income taxes on individuals and businesses,
the legislature insisted that the city income taxes mirror
the state income taxes, which then included a tax on unin-
corporated business. In the late 1970s, the state UBT was
abandoned. However, the city budget never seemed to have
enough leeway to permit the city to give up a tax that
yields about $400 million annually.
So, why did New York State, alone among the
states, ever have a UBT? The answer lies in the unusual
structure of the New York City economy. In most states,
the corporate income tax embraces a very large share of the
state’s economy, except for agriculture (which no legislators
like to tax, anyway). To be sure, there are many unincorpo-
rated businesses, but they tend to be very small in other
states. However, some of the most important industries
traditionally have operated here in the noncorporate form
of partnerships, even when the enterprises were very large.
Securities firms all were unincorporated for decades and
even now many big ones remain partnerships. This is true
in other aspects of finance as well. Almost as important is
the organization of large law, accounting, and other profes-
sional firms as partnerships. So, in New York State, to tax
only the income of corporations was to ignore the income
of some of the most important and most profitable sectors
of the economy.
This consideration is even more important for the
city than it is on a statewide basis. Another argument for con-
tinuing the city UBT even after the state repealed its UBT
has been the awareness that many of the high-income princi-
pals in financial and professional firms live outside the city. If
there were no UBT, the city’s tax system would not reach that
income. The city personal income tax is on residents only.
The city’s nonresident earnings tax has an extremely low rate.
In addition, by definition, if an enterprise is not incorporated,
it is not subject to the corporate tax. 
The criticism of the UBT is that it comes into play
only when small enterprises start to become successful.
According to some observers, the city may be a good place
for new small businesses to get started, but as soon as they
start to make it, the city government slaps them with the
UBT and other taxes, inviting them to depart to lower tax,
greener pastures. 
Who does pay this tax? Not the newly maturing
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ing to the New York City Department of Finance, large
partnership enterprises in finance, law, and other services
to business accounted for 72 percent of the payments in
1993. Another 14 percent was paid by doctors and other
health care providers. The quintessential small businesses
that politicians tend to worry about—in retail trade, man-
ufacturing, and personal services—accounted for 14 per-
cent of the tax receipts and about 7,000 of the 30,000 UBT
payers. The Department of Finance is able to identify the
residences of the taxpayers who account for about two-
thirds of the tax revenue: just under half this amount was
paid by commuters, 27,000 partners in taxpaying partner-
ships, and 9,000 individual proprietors.
Thus, the tax does seem to hit the targets it was
designed to hit: businesses mainly in finance that provide
services to other businesses, play an important part in the
New York City economy, and would otherwise escape, to a
considerable extent, the city’s taxes based on net income. It
would seem a strange strategy of economic development to
substantially reduce income taxes on large firms in indus-
tries for which the city and region still have strong loca-
tional advantages.
The tax on commercial rents, which is paid
directly by the renters themselves, began decades ago as a
minor, low-rate tax. The rate was greatly increased in the
1960s and 1970s, converting the tax to an important reve-
nue producer. After the fiscal crisis, exemption levels were
increased, rates were reduced for commercial premises out-
side the Manhattan central business district, and finally the
tax was eliminated for the city outside the central business
district, as an economic development measure. Here, too,
the critics of the tax view it as an oppressive burden on
small businesses that are struggling to survive or expand in
the city. 
That view confuses legal liability for the tax with
its economic incidence. At any given moment, the supply
of rentable commercial space is to a considerable extent
fixed and can change only over a period of years, while the
demand schedule for the space is entirely independent of
the actions of property owners and tax collectors. Under
such circumstances, it is impossible to imagine a scenario
in which an increase in the tax will raise the gross space
occupancy costs to tenants or a decrease will lower those
costs, except in the very short run. When new leases are
negotiated, renters surely will consider the commercial
rent tax liability change in making their offers to building
owners, who will be entirely aware of the tax change. For
example, when the market for midtown Manhattan office
space is strong, as at present, repeal of the commercial rent
tax would result in higher rents at renewal than would
have been the case were the tax still in effect; in lower
Manhattan, with a weak market, rents at renewal would
not be reduced as much as otherwise would be necessary to
clear the market. The net effect of repeal would be to
increase the capital value of the property, with little or no
effect on economic activity.24
There are some parallels between the commercial
rent tax and the high property taxes on commercial real
property (relative to residential property) that are the gen-
eral rule in New York City, Nassau County, and other
places in the region. If the commercial property tax were
highly uniform among individual properties within a city
or other taxing jurisdiction, that is, highly correlated with
some market measure of value—as the commercial rent tax
is with market rentals—it is not evident that a uniform
reduction in the tax would have much of an economic
development impact. At least one simulation study has
shown that a large across-the-board reduction in commer-
cial property taxes in New York City would have only a
negligible positive effect on total employment in the
city.25
However, the commercial property tax is rarely
uniform among individual properties. Usually, in the
absence of property tax abatement programs or deals, the
effective rate of property taxes on new commercial build-
ings is considerably higher than the rate on most older
buildings that are not functionally obsolete or in unfavored
locations. That is, the decision to raze an older, smaller
building and replace it with a newer, larger one may trig-
ger a very large tax increase, entirely disproportionate to
the difference in market values. In part, this is because the
assessor then revalues the site from a level far below its
market value to a level more closely approaching that
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conduct (the market value of the site has not changed) but
is common nonetheless. In any event, the higher the level
of tax, the more likely it is to be a deterrent to new invest-
ment. At the extreme, this can produce a situation in
which no new commercial construction is feasible without
tax abatements.26
The elimination of discriminatorily high taxation
on new buildings in general would have positive incentive
effects, and could sensibly substitute for negotiated abate-
ment deals, given the spotty record of the latter. However,
there is another, and much more powerful, way to increase
the incentives for new construction: It is high time that
serious consideration be given to land-value taxation, as a
substitute for all or part of the property tax on structures
(and perhaps for some other taxes as well). Economists are
well aware of the theoretical virtues of land-value taxation.
Unlike every other tax, actual and conceivable (other than a
head tax), the tax is entirely neutral with respect to eco-
nomic decision making.27 Differentials in tax rates will not
affect the location of economic activity, unlike all other
taxes, nor affect the choice among conceivable uses of spe-
cific sites. The burden of the tax is borne by the owner of
the site at the time the tax is imposed or increased: it can-
not be shifted to any other economic actor. That makes the
incidence of the tax as progressive as any conceivable tax
because the elasticity of the value of urban land ownership
with respect to income is positive and very high.
In reality, taxes on land values are significantly
lower than those on the value of structures in nearly every
place in this country, and markedly so in nearly all the
most urbanized parts of this region (as well as in some of
the less densely developed sections, such as eastern Suffolk
County). This is visible in the very low assessments of
vacant land, in the assessments of land that is sold for re-
use, and in the low assessments of residential parcels in
prime neighborhoods. Why land is so favored, and has
been for so long, is something of a mystery, not fully
explained by the undoubted power of large landowners in
state and local politics or the thorough misunderstanding
of the likely consequences of land-value taxation for most
owners of modest houses. One part of the explanation may
be the lack of good empirical evidence on the results of
heavier taxes on land value than on structures, in places and
at times that are relevant to American urban regions today.
Century-old experiences in western Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand are not very persuasive.
There has been a good recent study of an experi-
ence that is relevant to the New York region today (Oates
and Schwab 1995). Since the 1920s, the city of Pittsburgh
has imposed higher tax rates on land value than on build-
ings (a number of smaller Pennsylvania cities have done so
for shorter periods). Until 1980, the tax differential in
Pittsburgh was quite small, but it was increased very
sharply in 1980. Pittsburgh experienced a very impressive
central city construction boom during the 1980s, one of
the highest rates seen in American cities. Oates and
Schwab studied the relationship between the tax change
and the level of commercial construction using a long list
of large American cities for comparison, and concluded
that the property tax changes were probably responsible for
a considerable fraction of the new investment. Economists
would have predicted this, but now the prediction has been
substantiated.
The careful reader will note that my list of plausi-
ble tax strategies does not include what has been the most
popular tax policy strategy for economic development in
New York for the past thirteen years and more recently in
other states: repeated reductions in the rates of the state
personal income tax. This has been an extremely costly
strategy, and the only evidence of its effectiveness lies in
the strident assertions of its proponents. Of the 123 studies
examined by Bartik, in only a single instance were differ-
ences in personal income tax rates significant (and nega-
tive): a study of Philadelphia’s extremely high local income
tax by Robert Inman.28 
The assertions of the proponents of personal
income tax reduction as a serious economic development
strategy are implausible. First, the proponents claim that
people with high incomes from capital will avoid living in
a high-tax state, thus adversely affecting consumption
spending and, allegedly, making the decision not to locate
enterprises they control in that state. The classic example
used is the location of plants and corporate offices during
the 1970s and 1980s in Fairfield County rather than inFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / FEBRUARY 1997 105
Westchester County, two counties that are quite similar in
numerous respects. Even if true, this has to be an isolated
effect, and one that will be less important over time. Sec-
ond, it is asserted that high personal income taxes will
require firms in that state to pay higher wages, to the
extent that the firms compete nationally (or internation-
ally) for labor or certain types of labor, and to offset the
indirect effects of high state taxes on wages and prices in
consumer-serving industries in the state. 
We academics operate in national labor markets
and are well aware that tax differentials affect the compen-
sation that must be offered; the question is the size of the
effect, not its reality, for the economy as a whole. If high
local taxes and living costs for key staff people were the
major determinant of location, there would be few Ameri-
can firms opening offices in Tokyo, Zurich, Frankfurt, and
Paris, where living costs (including local taxes) for Ameri-
can expatriate staff are enormously higher than they are in
New York. Simple calculations suggest that in most cases
the higher levels of compensation for key staff people
required in the high personal income tax states must be a
very small fraction of total costs.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
AND “NEW WAVE” POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Earlier, I alluded to the general failure of explicit, highly
selective economic development programs that worked on
reducing input costs by providing cheap credit or by subsi-
dizing worker training. Aside from tax incentive measures,
which informally date back to the colonial era, the use of
the borrowing powers of state and local government to
subsidize credit to private enterprises in the interests of
economic development is the oldest of state and local gov-
ernment economic development measures. Before the Civil
War, the states lent money on a large scale to canal and
railroad companies and to organizers of banks, usually with
unhappy financial results. By the late nineteenth century,
most state constitutions were amended to prohibit such
lending. 
In 1936, however, the Mississippi constitution
was amended to authorize the issuance of general obliga-
tion bonds by local governments to finance construction of
manufacturing plants. Within a few years, a number of
states imitated Mississippi, but they used revenue bonds as
the financing mechanism. By the end of the 1960s, nearly
all the states were doing this, often not because of any great
enthusiasm for the approach, but because their competitors
were using it. The subsidy, of course, was from federal
funds: the exemption of interest on state and local bonds
from federal income taxation, especially valuable in an era
of very high marginal income tax rates. 
It soon became obvious that this form of inter-
jurisdictional competition was a zero-sum game from a
national standpoint, and possibly even from a state stand-
point, once all states were doing the same thing. Federal
tax legislation from 1969 onward has progressively limited
the size, volume, and purposes of state and local borrowing
for economic development that qualify for income tax
exemption. The change has reduced the charms of the
approach but has not eliminated some instances of major
state and local bond issues, sometimes taxable under fed-
eral law, that are said to be economic development mea-
sures. The most notable are the bond issues to build new
facilities for major-league commercial sports; benefit-cost
analyses by economists almost always show these to be bad
ideas, even from the local standpoint.
In the 1980s, a number of studies evaluated a broad
range of credit and other state and local economic develop-
ment incentives.29 Benefit-cost ratios seldom reached 1.0,
and even when the ratios passed that threshold, it was not by
much. In other fields—such as infrastructure investment
decisions—benefit-cost ratios of 2.0 are considered quite
marginal. Systematic econometric analysis of these incen-
tives is very difficult because the policy variables differ so
much from place to place. Moreover, many of these incentive
programs are very small, yielding effects that are likely to be
below the measurement threshold.
In the 1970s, a new concept in economic develop-
ment programming emerged: the enterprise zone. (The
name of the idea changes over time; the cynic will say that
this alone suggests that the proponents have little confi-
dence in the efficacy of the programs, hoping that a new
name will mask the disappointing results of the previous
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identification of a relatively small geographic area as a tar-
get zone for economic development and the availability of a
wide range of incentives to encourage firms to expand (or
newly locate) their activities within the zone. Sometimes
the target zone is one in which there was significant eco-
nomic activity in the past but where that activity has
declined substantially. Sometimes the target zone is simply
one in which poor people live. The development of research
parks is a form of very upscale enterprise zone.
In concept, the enterprise zone is a more promising
approach than conventional economic development pro-
grams simply because of the spatial concentration, that is,
the likelihood that the program size will be larger relative
to the target economy and the possibility that economies of
agglomeration can be developed (although the target zone
can be quite large in big cities, such as the new Harlem–
South Bronx “empowerment zone” in New York City). Few
successes, however, have been reported. Bartik lists nine
studies of enterprise zones and research parks published
between 1984 and 1991: three reported mildly positive and
significant effects, four reported no statistically significant
effects, and two reported that things turned out worse in
the enterprise zones than in control areas.
Although some politicians remain captivated by
the enterprise zone concept, more sophisticated interven-
tionists write in glowing terms of “new wave” economic
development policies pursued by rising “entrepreneurial
state” governments, described by Bartik as “an eclectic
group of policies that became popular in many states dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s. These policies encour-
age various forms of innovation, such as applied research,
industrial modernization, entrepreneurship, and business
expansion into export markets. They also have in common
a willingness to involve government much more with busi-
ness decisions. Rather than just providing cash, they would
have government provide services to businesses to help
them determine their best market or technology” (Bartik
1991, p. 5).
Any number of rude comments can be made about
the concept, such as the evident misunderstanding of the
role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in
Japan or the fact that they seem to have slept through the
collapse of socialism all over the world. A more polite
response is that we have yet to see any American state that
has had great recent economic success that can be attrib-
uted to these new wave programs. Even the advocates admit
that they have no real evidence for their propositions.
CONCLUSION
Surely, it would be best if public policies in the New York
region were simply neutral at the outset. As Assar Lind-
beck, long-time chairman of the selection committee for
the Nobel Prize in Economic Science, wrote concerning
national economic development policies in Sweden: “It is
not by planting trees or subsidizing tree planting in a
desert created by politicians that the government can pro-
mote...industry, but by refraining from measures that cre-
ate a desert environment.”30 However, it is not possible to
recreate a verdant environment without hostile policies in
the New York region, so some intervention is necessary, if
only to create oases in the desert.
Still, one can dream about what that verdant envi-
ronment might look like. It would be a place with drastic
reductions in the costs of both construction and everyday
existence for both the public and private sectors, reductions
that would clearly require a long list of changes, institu-
tional and behavioral, on the supply side. However, it is
not all that clear what a full list of the required changes
would include. The occasional efforts that are made by
both journalists and policy analysts to explain fully the dif-
ferences in costs in a specific situation seldom are success-
ful.31 
Nonetheless, if enough people in the region were
convinced that our economic future depended on a compre-
hensive menu of cost-reducing changes, only some of
which are matters of public policy and practice, the desert
could be pushed back significantly. This could occur, for
example, by tort law reform, by drastic deregulation of
many aspects of economic life (not just the politically easy
ones such as utility deregulation),32 by real enforcement of
laws requiring civil behavior in traffic (to reduce transpor-
tation costs, by matching the levels of enforcement every-
where outside the Northeast) and in other situations (such
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trash removal in New York City right now), and by com-
prehensive use of part-time employees for jobs that should
not require eight-hour shifts, notably transit operators and
school bus drivers.
An encouraging sign that economically destruc-
tive habits can change even in this region lies in the recent
instances in which public and private decision makers seem
to have concluded that the region has something to learn
from what is done elsewhere in North America, after at
least 150 years dominated by contrary views. We are
beginning to see retail stores, for “convenience goods” as
well as “shopping goods,” that are efficiently sized (long
after the rest of the country), and to hear that transit offi-
cials in the region are consulting with transit operators
elsewhere about the design of subway cars. Such develop-
ments have to be good.108 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / FEBRUARY 1997 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. See Netzer (1974) for a discussion that reflects the tenor of those times.
The state of the New York economy and how that affected public policy
over the past thirty years are reviewed in Netzer (1990).
2. See Sleeper (1989) for a volume of essays first published in Dissent in
1987. Six of the first eight essays attack city economic development
policies as unneeded, and worse.
3. The study was conducted by the Harvard University Graduate School
of Public Administration for the Regional Plan Association, under the
direction of Raymond Vernon, between 1956 and 1959. The results of
the study appear in nine substantive books and one technical monograph.
The capstone is Vernon’s 1960 book.
4. See Netzer (1969) for a contemporary account of the validity of the
Vernon forecasts. Netzer (1985) also examines the Vernon forecasts at the
end of the forecast period. The projections of the national economy in the
Vernon study did not foresee the reduced role of manufacturing over the
period, but adjusting for that failure—which was common to all long-
range forecasts in the 1950s and 1960s—the Vernon projections for the
New York region were surprisingly on target.
5. Specific projections consistent with the views expressed here were
developed by the Regional Plan Association (RPA) in 1988 and 1989 for
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The more recent RPA
projections, which are the basis of the “Third Regional Plan” (see Yaro
and Hiss 1996), are much more pessimistic and internally inconsistent in
numerous respects; the economic projections seem designed mainly to
sound a cry of alarm in support of policies that RPA espouses
independently of their consequences for the region’s economy, such as the
enormous investment of public funds in rail transit.
6. A simple example, for a relatively short period, makes the point: the
motor vehicle manufacturing industry between 1980 and 1992. Had the
actual 46 percent increase in hourly productivity and the actual 3 percent
increase in employment been correctly forecast, the forecaster might have
guessed that output would increase from 8.0 million cars and trucks in
1980 to 12.0 million in 1992. The actual increase in units produced was
much more modest, 9.7 million. Obviously, each unit embodied
substantially more product in 1992 than it did in 1980. However, it is
improbable that the 1980 forecaster would have so specified the results.
7. The work Glaeser refers to includes the following papers: Rotember
and Saloner (1990), Topel and Ward (1992), Becker and Murphy (1992),
Rauch (1993), Glaeser (1994), Glaeser and Maré (1994), Ades and
Glaeser (1995), and Glaeser (1995).
8. Moreover, there are apt to be widely separated clusters of office
buildings, as in Atlanta, rather than tight clusters in central business
districts.
9. The WEFA (Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates) model results
that the RPA relied upon in work done for the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority in 1986 and 1987 had female labor force
participation rates virtually equal to male rates among New York City
residents by 2005, a projection that was not credible. Such a result
requires either that very few women with children remain outside the
labor force during the child-rearing age, or that the unequal distribution
of child-rearing duties by gender be offset by women retiring at later ages
than men (which is the opposite of the current situation in this and every
other advanced economy). 
10. Perhaps the best case made for this side of the debate appears in
Eisinger (1988).
11. Bartik also reviews the results of the small number of studies dealing
with two aspects of regulation: environmental regulation and banking
regulation.
12. The best analysis of this question is found in Small, Winston, and
Evans (1989). To simplify, there are two types of costs entailed in the
provision of the road system: road surface wear costs and congestion costs.
The former differ among vehicles with the cube of the weight on each
axle, above a threshold that includes passenger cars, virtually all light
trucks, and some heavier trucks that have multiple axles; below the
threshold, road wear costs are zero. Congestion costs differ among
vehicles almost entirely on the basis of time of day and direction of travel;
size has almost nothing to do with these costs. So, charging light trucks
registration fees and tolls that are a multiple of the charges imposed on
passenger cars is nothing but price discrimination, as is charging
multiple-axle rigs with relatively modest axle loadings far more than
smaller heavy vehicles with few axles, such as ready-mix-concrete trucks
and dump trucks.
13. An excellent example is the immunity of the New York City Fire
Department to retrenchment in times of budgetary difficulty throughout
the past twenty-five years, despite clear evidence that appropriate spatial
deployment of firefighters (that is, closing many firehouses and opening
a few new ones in better locations) would permit both reduced response
time and drastic staff reductions. The proposed closing of any firehouse
immediately produces a local uproar, which elected officials will not face
down.
14. These are my own estimates, as of fiscal 1994, based on data from
various official documents, especially the New York City ComptrollerENDNOTES (Continued)
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(1994) and the New York City Department of Finance (1995). The
target ratio of assessed to market value for property classes other than
homeowner properties is 45 percent, which would yield effective tax
rates of 4 to 5 percent for those classes. However, that ratio is seldom
achieved for existing properties because of restrictions in state law and
administrative lags in reassessment.
15. For a package of such policies, see Netzer (1992). Converting tolls into
cost-based congestion charges is one of those policies (see endnote 10).
16. Depreciated replacement cost is the concept used by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis in its application of the “perpetual inventory” method
to value tangible, reproducible fixed capital.
17. Kenneth Button, a transportation economist, and his colleagues,
reporting the results of a large-scale study of location in the Strathclyde
region of Scotland, conclude that differences in local transport quality
within the region constitute an important independent variable.
Wassmer, in an empirical study of location in eastern Michigan cities,
finds that most local incentives have no “additive effect” but some
spending variables do, depending on city-specific characteristics.
18. Eventually, the program was confined to the outer boroughs and the
nonaffluent part of Manhattan, thus becoming an ordinary middle-class
housing subsidy, not an economic development measure. For an analysis
that demonstrates how wasteful the program had been, see White (1983).
This analysis was one of the few entirely unambiguous ex post facto
empirical studies of tax incentive programs, because the author had
actual before and after sales prices to compare.
19. Presumably, the reason was partly that the data on manufacturing for
small areas are abundant and rich in industry detail and partly that
within a detailed industrial category, there is a good deal of homogeneity
across places.
20. Most of the intra-area studies used the property tax rate as the tax
variable. The studies by James and Leslie Papke, however, used the
effective tax rate for all state and local taxes combined, simulated by
industry from their AFTAX model. This tax measure is far and away the
best conceivable.
21. The economists’ position was absurd: The appropriate statement at
the time was that we had been unable to find convincing empirical
evidence of the strength of the tax effects, not that the effects were absent.
A 1961 article by Harvey E. Brazer, well known to most public finance
economists, put the argument properly, reviving an analysis first
presented to a royal commission by Alfred Marshall a century ago.
However, it took the improvement of data for small areas, the
development of adequate econometric techniques, and (most important)
the training of generations of well-equipped inquisitive economists to
produce the empirical verifications. The process is a testimonial to the
validity of the old-fashioned idea of scientific progress.
22. In the early 1990s (the latest period for which the necessary data
exist), state and local taxes in New York State as a percentage of GSP
were about 35 percent above the national average, those in New Jersey
were about 10 percent above the average, and those in Connecticut were
just below the national average.
23. Among the distortions caused by current tax practices is the choice
between fuel oil and natural gas as a source of energy, the former bearing
much lower taxes because it is not supplied by entities defined as
utilities. Fuel oil is not a significant source of energy for space heating
anywhere in the United States outside the Northeast.
24. In an office building construction boom, repeal of the commercial
rent tax very likely would heighten the boom by encouraging more
speculative building. However, more empty office space (when the boom
ends) is not a valid objective of economic development policy.
25. See New York University (1980). The study simulated the results of
classifying all taxable property into one of two classes—housing and
business—and equalizing effective property tax rates between the two
classes, an approach that produced a uniform 20-odd-percent reduction
in taxes on all business properties. The study did not deal with the
consequences of more within-class uniformity. Because the overall
effective tax rate was unchanged in the simulation, the conclusion in this
study does not conflict with the view held by most public finance
economists on the results of reductions in overall rates in a single city on
the migration of capital among cities and regions (see Heilbrun [1983]).
26. In the city of Boston from the 1930s until 1960, there were no new
office buildings or hotels constructed, because such buildings would have
confronted an effective property tax rate of 10 percent, at least three times
as high as the comparable rate for new office buildings in any other U.S.
city at the time. Construction of new commercial buildings began only
after passage of a state law that provided for a tax of 10 percent of gross
rents, not value, for new buildings in designated urban renewal zones—
such as all of Back Bay and the South End.
27. There is one exception extensively discussed in the literature. Unless
the tax base is properly defined, the tax is likely to affect the timing of
development of sites and therefore have some distorting effects on
economic decisions.
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28. There was another study in which personal income tax rates were
significant, but the coefficient was positive, a thoroughly implausible
finding.
29. These studies are discussed in Netzer (1991).
30. Quoted in the Economist, March 3, 1990, p. 17.
31. For example, when one tries to explain why retail gasoline prices are
so high relative to prices in other places on both the East and West
Coasts, even in parts of the New York region where land values are low,
it is discovered that obvious variables such as state and local taxes and
wage rates leave large unexplained differences. Even the addition of more
subtle factors such as wage rates and restrictions on the size of
underground fuel tanks and tank delivery trucks do not clear up the
mystery.
32. A few places in the country, notably the state of Arizona, have
completely deregulated taxi service. What would taxi fares be without
restriction of entry, so that the cost of amortizing the medallion was zero?
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